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In Camera Inspections Under the
Freedom of Information Act
Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act1 (FOIA) in 1966
in furtherance of its belief that "an informed electorate is vital to the
proper operation of a democracy." 2 The Act's major provision3 directs
government agencies to release identifiable records in their possession
to "any person" who requests them, 4 subject to the nine exemptions
"specifically stated" 5 in the statute.6 If the agency fails to release the
records on request, the requester may sue in district court for an in-
junction against the withholding of the records. In such a proceeding,
"the court shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on
the agency to sustain its action."7
Although the FOIA has significantly increased the amount of agency
information available to the public,8 it has also been severely criticized
for the imprecise language and apparent arbitrariness of its standards. 9
Ambiguities in the provisions, together with bureaucratic resistance to
the Act's requirements, 10 have spawned considerable litigation in the
Act's short history of operation."
1 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
2 S. RiEP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 813].
3 Other provisions require the agency to publish certain information in the Federal
Register, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1970); and to make available for public inspection its final
opinions, statements of policy and interpretation, and staff manuals and instructions, id.
§ 552(a)(2).
4 Id. § 552(a)(3).
5 Id. § 552(c).
6 Id. § 552(b)(1)-(9).
7 Id. § 552(a)(3).
8 See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, ADMINISTRATION OF THE FREEDONM OF
INFORMATION AcT, H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as 1972 HousE REPORT].
9 For example, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, the Act's most influential commentator,
described it as a "shabby product." Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis,
34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 807 (1967); see Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Consumers Union v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp.
796, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971). Inter-
pretation of the Act is complicated by the fact that the House and Senate committee
reports on the Act contradict each other in many particulars, and in some instances
contradict the statutory language itself. See Davis, supra, at 762-63, 790.
10 See Giannella, Agency Procedures Implementing the Freedom of Information Act:
A Proposal for Uniform Regulations, 23 AD. L. REv. 217, 224 (1971). See generally Engel,
Introduction: Information Disclosure Policies and Practices of Federal Administrative
Agencies, 68 Nw. U.L R.v. 184 (1973).
11 Eighty-two cases were pending on November 1, 1973. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari
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In reviewing agency claims of exemption under the Act, courts have
resorted to in camera inspection of the requested materials. For many
years courts have used in camera proceedings to determine whether
allegedly protected information should be introduced into evidence, 12
and the FOIA was "legislated against the backdrop of [these prece-
dents]."'13
The first section of this comment discusses the advantages and dis-
advantages of the in camera procedure. The factors that the court
should weigh in determining whether to engage in an in camera
review' 4 are then discussed. The third section applies the criteria
developed to the specific exemptions of the Act.
I. TnE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF IN CAMERA INSPECTION
Stated in its most appealing form, in camera inspection allows the
judge to decide the case on its facts. The basic question in a contested
FOIA suit is whether certain words fit certain exemptions. Quite apart
from the possibility that the agency has deliberately misdescribed its
records,15 the ambiguities in some of the exemption provisions create
situations in which reasonable persons could differ on the classification.
at 9, Rosen v. Vaughn, 94 S. Ct. 1564 (1974), denying cert. to Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d
820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
2 Courts have used such procedures for over ninety years. See Badische Anilin und
Soda Fabrik v. Levenstein, 24 Ch. D. 145, rev'd on other grounds, L.R. 29 Ch. D. 366
(CA.), rev'd, L.R. 12 App. Cas. 710 (1883), discussed in Wigmore, Evidence-Trade Secret
-How to Prove It as a Plaintiff, 26 ILL. L. Rxv. 564 (1932). See also Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d
509 (1958).
13 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 88-89 (1973). The House of Representatives has approved
an amendment to the Act confirming that "the court... may examine the contents of
any agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof
shall be withheld ...." H.R. 12471, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § l(d) (1974); see 120 CONG. Rtc.
H. 1787-803 (daily ed. March 14, 1974). The Senate has passed a similar measure. See
S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § l(b)(2) (1974); 120 CoNG. RFc. S. 9310-43 (daily ed. May 30,
1974).
14 FOIA suits are original proceedings conducted in accordance with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. However, the actions are functionally similar to appeals from agency
decisions, and in this comment they are often discussed as if in the posture of appellate
review.
15 Cf. Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591 (D. Del. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 479 F.2d 317
(3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 448 (1973); Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971). In each case the court required an in
camera inspection solely to determine whether the requested records were, as the agency
maintained, an investigatory file. See also Engel, supra note 10, at 205-06; Nader,
Freedom From Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARv. Civ. RicHTs-Civ. Lm. L.
Rxv. 1, 10-12 (1970). "Misdescription" can, of course, also result from the insertion of, non-
exempt items into an exempt file to prevent disclosure. See Giannella, supra note 10, at
223-24; Nader, supra, at 9-10.
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Congress intended that the courts should make the final determination
of the appropriate classification. 16 A developing body of case law holds
that the process of classification properly includes the isolation and
disclosure of nonexempt items present in an otherwise exempt docu-
ment or file,17 and the removal of exempt material, such as trade
secrets, from a disclosable document.'
The virtue of in camera inspection is that it provides an individual-
ized determination. This benefit, however, has its costs. First, an in
camera proceeding does not give the requester an opportunity to present
an informed interpretation of the facts, and thus denies him procedural
protections normally viewed as necessary.' 9 Second, if the requester
fails at the trial level, he faces unusual burdens in contesting the ruling
on appeal, for the trial court's ruling, unlike the agency's decision, is
given considerable weight by the appeals court, and the requester
again has no ability to offer alternative interpretations of fact.
In light of these problems, the applicant might be better off if the
16 See S. REP. No. 813, supra note 2, at 8.
17 See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bristol-Meyers
Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
18 See, e.g., Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298 (1973). The statute
specifically authorizes such deletions for agency opinions that are made available for
public inspection and copying. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970).
19 Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624, 640-41; 1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONAL-
or JuDICIAL EVmENCE 522-24 (1827); Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential Informa-
tion by the Federal Trade Commission: The Hearing, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 401, 403-04
(1968). Judge Gerhard Gesell expressed such a view quite forcefully in one FOIA case:
"It is entirely foreign to our traditions to place papers in the hands of a judge for his
private ex parte inspection, excluding them from the eyes of the litigants. This is a course
that should be followed only under the most compelling necessity ...." Moss v. Laird,
Civil No. 12454-71 (D.D.C., Dec. 7, 1971) (unreported), quoted in Hearings on the Ad-
ministration and Operation of the Freedom of Information Act Before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2412 (1972) [herein-
after cited as 1972 Hearings]. Gesell's view, however, has not been followed.
In other litigation contexts there has been limited experimentation with disclosure of
secret information to an adverse party's counsel, accompanied by a protective order en-
joining him from revealing the evidence to anyone, including his client. See Grand Union,
Co., 62 F.T.C. 1491 (1963) (business secrets); Columbia Broadcasting Co., 62 F.T.C. 1518
(1963) (same). However, in FOIA actions, where acquiring the information is the pur-
pose of the suit, the temptation to release it would likely be overwhelming in a number
of cases. William A. Dobrovir, who has represented a number of FOIA plaintiffs, sug-
gested at House subcommittee hearings that FOIA actions should be conducted in this
way. He argued that lawyers could be trusted just as judges conducting as in camera in-
spection are trusted. 1972 Hearings, supra, at 1396. Dobrovir himself provided evidence
to the contrary some months later, however, when a court admonished him for playing
a White House tape recording for friends at a party. The tape had been obtained
through discovery in a suit brought by Ralph Nader, with Dobrovir as counsel. N.Y.
Times, December 19, 1973, at 27, col. 4.
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judicial applications of the exemptions did not utilize inspection.
Even where a mechanical ruling would be against disclosure, a clear
rule that uses known facts may spare the requester the consider-
able expense20 of bringing an unwarranted FOIA action. In addition,
agencies sometimes make offers of partial disclosure,21 and judicial
standards that did not involve in camera inspection would permit the
applicant to determine better the acceptability of such offers.
Third, decisions based on in camera review of evidence have little
precedential value, because the judge is unable to give any detailed
explanation of his findings. Ignorance of the dispositive facts in prior
cases may impede the parties from settling out of court; or, if they do
go to trial, they may have problems relying on, distinguishing, or
criticizing the reasoning of earlier decisions. 22
Finally, substantial reliance on in camera review puts great burdens
on the resources of the courts and the agencies. The agencies will have
to make their decisions on the type of case-by-case basis that in camera
inspection involves, not orily in the cdse being litigated, but also in
the vastly larger number of cases23 that never reach the courtroom. If
the legal standards are subtle, the agency will be unable to entrust the
handling of FOIA requests to low-level personnel. The burden of
reading and classifying requested documents will absorb the time, and
energy of professionals. 24 The burden of classification increases con-
siderably when the agency is required to dissect a lengthy file into
component parts and decide which subsections should be disclosed.25
-Although the government is entitled by law to assess "fair and equita-
ble" costs against the requester,20 it is under heavy pressure to minimize
20 See 1972 HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 73-74. See also Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F.
Supp. 1321, 1326 (DD.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Ditlow v. Brinegdr, 34
AD. L.2D 520 (D.C. Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. May 28,
1974).
21 E.g., Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 844 (4th Cir. 1973); Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd.,
473 F.2d 109, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
22 Cf. Gellhorn, supra note 19, at 403-04.
23 According to a House subcommittee study of the first four years' experience under
the Act, fewer than one out of seven initial refusals of FOIA requests resulted in an
administrative appeal, and less than half of those cases reached a district court. Further,
these figures do not take account of the fact that the vast majority of formal FOIA re-
quests are granted. 1972 Hearings, supra note 19, at 1338-43.
24 See Koch, The Freedom of Information Act: Suggestions for Making Information
Available to the Public, 32 MD. L. REV. 189, 205 (1972). This responsibility can delay con-
siderably the agency's response to the request, cf. Giannella, supra note 10, at 223.
25 Koch, supra note 24, at 203-04.
26 Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), with 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1970).
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its charges,27 and it commonly does so.28 Thus the public bears the cost
when judicial requirements of exactitude unreasonably strain the
budgets of the agencies. There must be some limits to the burden that
Congress intended to impose on the executive branch.
29
In camera review can also be extremely burdensome to the courts.
Reading hundreds of pages of a document or file to decide whether any
of them can be disclosed requires considerable time and effort. The
task is made especially difficult by the fact that there is no adversary
debate to narrow and sharpen the analysis.30 Indeed, the agencies have
an incentive to thrust this duty upon the court; they may hope that a
busy judge will uncritically accept broad claims of exemption in order
to avoid the task of intensive review.31
In Vaughn v. Rosen,3 2 the court of appeals, in order to alleviate the
strain on judicial resources, required the agency not only to furnish
the requested records to the district court for in camera inspection,
but also to submit a "relatively detailed analysis in manageable seg-
ments," indexing each claimed exemption to specific portions of the
contested documents. 3 This requirement may be justified as in accord
with the agency's statutory burden of proof.34 Nevertheless, Vaughn is
a disturbing reminder that someone will have a time-consuming, expen-
sive task when determination of the merits of the request is based on
intensive examination of the documents.
35
27 See, e.g., 1972 HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 82 (House Committee); cf. Giannella,
supra note 10, at 270 (recommendation of Administrative Conference of the United
States that screening should be performed without charge "[a]s a rule").
28 1972 Hearings, supra note 19, at 1381-82.
29 Irons v. Schuyler, 465 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972) (deny-
ing, as indiscriminately broad, plaintiff's request for access to all past manuscript deci-
sions of the Patent Office, with appropriate deletions to be made by the Office). But cf.
Weilford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24 (4th Cir. 1971). See also note 36 infra.
30 Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1564
"(1974).
31 Id. at 826.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 826-27. The court suggested that the district judge could employ a special
master to further lighten the burden of examination. It is questionable, however,
whether this justification for using a master would constitute the "exceptional condition"
required by Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See La Buy v. Howes
Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); 87 HARV. L. REV. 854, 861 (1974). But cf. Comment, An
Adjudicative Role for Federal Magistrates in Civil Cases, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 584 (1973).
34 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
35 Other devices that courts have used to reduce the burdens of review include in-
specting a sample of the documents requested, Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 355 F. Supp.
1171, 1173 (D.D.C. 1973); Wecksler v. Shultz, 324 F. Supp. 1084, 1085 (D.D.C. 1971) (mem.);
see EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 (1973); National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 479
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II. TOWARDS A FLEXIBLE THEORY
Unfortunately, the courts have often ignored the burdens that in
camera inspections entail, and have failed adequately to develop func-
tional criteria for determination of when in camera inspection is
warranted.
In Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink,36 the Supreme Court
reviewed a government claim under exemption 5, which protects
"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not
be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with
the agency." 37 The Court found unduly rigid the lower court's sug-
gestion that in camera inspection should be undertaken as a matter of
course 38 and went on to suggest alternative procedures: the judge could
accept "detailed affidavits or oral testimony.... A representative docu-
ment of those sought may be selected for in camera inspection. And,
of course, the agency may itself disclose the [nonexempt] portions of
the contested documents and attempt to show . . . that the excised
portions constitute the bare bones of protected matter."39 The Court
showed a readiness to treat different exemptions in different ways and
suggested that adequate review does not, in all cases, require in camera
inspection.40 The Court did not, however, explicate the general policies
that should guide courts in determining when to engage in in camera
inspection.41
This section suggests several factors that should be taken into account
in such a calculus. These criteria identify situations in which the
flexibility and additional factual foundation of in camera review are
most needed. The analysis also attempts to define the circumstances in
which the benefits of judicial inspection are lower and, consequently,
F.2d 183, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1973); ordering the agency to release indexes to the requested
material, so that plaintiff can narrow his request, Irons v. Gottschalk, 369 F. Supp. 403
(D.D.C. 1974); and dismissing a suit on the grounds that a sweeping request is not for
"identifiable records" within the meaning of section 552(a)(3), Irons v. Schuyler, 465 F.2d
608 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972). The Act does not permit use of the
latter tactic, however, except in extreme cases. See Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d
935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). See generally Giannella, supra note
10, at 231-40.
36 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
37 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
38 410 U.S. at 93.
39 Id.
40 With respect to documents for which the national security exemption, section
552(b)(1), was claimed, the Court stated that in camera inspection would never be appro-
priate. 410 U.S. at 84. See text and notes at notes 65-69 infra.
41 The Court's only policy argument on this point pertained exclusively to the agency
memoranda exemption. See text and notes at notes 135-38 infra.
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may be outweighed by the inconvenience and uncertainty that ac-
company in camera proceedings.
A. Existence of a Factual Dispute
If the parties are essentially in agreement on the legally relevant
facts in the case, there is no problem for the court to resolve by direct
inspection.42 This type of case can appear in at least three situations.
First, some of the exemptions contain tests that are straightforward
enough for judges to determine from the pleadings whether the exemp-
tions are properly invoked.43 Second, the disclosability of some broad
types of records will become established by precedent, and judges will
recognize that there can be no serious argument on the issue.44 Third,
even where neither statutory language nor judicial precedent is clear,
there may still be agreement about what the records contain-as, for
instance, if the question is whether a certain list of names must be
released.45
B. Relevance of the Contents to the Issue of Exemption
If the parties disagree on important issues of fact, the court should
consider whether the factual dispute can be clarified by in camera
inspection. With some of the Act's exemptions, disclosability may
depend on such matters as why the records were written or compiled,
46
how the agency acquired the information within them,47 what the
agency does with them, 48 or how the agency plans to use them in the
future.49 Frequently, analysis of the requested document will not answer
these questions. In these cases, affidavits should provide sufficient basis
for decision, or agency personnel may testify on the history or the
uses of the disputed records.5" Witnesses from outside the government
might also be asked to testify if disclosure threatened their interests.
51
42 See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Cr.
1564 (1974).
43 See text and notes at notes 62-80 infra.
44 Assuming, of course, that there is no allegation of misdescription. See text and
note at note 15 supra.
45 See, e.g., Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204
(1971).
46 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(5) & (b)(7) (1970).
47 Id. § 552(b)(4).
48 Id. § 552(b)(2).
49 Id. § 552(b)(7).
50 But see Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 371 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1973), an unusual
case in which the judge ordered in camera inspection of a set of staff minutes so that
he could look for evidence that another set of memoranda was disclosable. Here the
staff minutes were treated simply as evidence bearing on pending litigation, although
the court had already decided that they were not themselves disclosable under the FOIA.
51 See text and note at note 120 infra.
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C. The Public's Interest in Disclosure
When these rather mechanical considerations do not yield a clear
solution, courts should ask whether the requester's access to the type
of information involved in the case deserves special vindication in light
of the purposes of the Act.52
One of the goals of the FOIA was to redress the balance of power
between individuals and agencies, to minimize arbitrary, discrimi-
natory, or erroneous decisions based on "secret law" (undisclosed agency
case law and working interpretations of the laws).5 The legislative
history of the FOIA demonstrates that public disclosure was also in-
tended to serve a broader political function. Congress was concerned
that "[a] democratic society requires an informed, intelligent elec-
torate." 54 Information was viewed as the means for a popular check
52 Courts have been slow to recognize that the public's interest in confining the
breadth of the exemptions is not equally strong for all nine provisions. Many opinions
have cited dictum from Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970): "The legislative plan creates a liberal disclosure requirement,
limited only by specific exemptions which are to be narrowly construed." A number of
decisions have followed that rule without analyzing whether a narrow construction of
the exemption or exemptions involved in the case at bar would be desirable in terms of
the Act's specific purposes. See, e.g., Stretch v. Weinberger, 359 F. Supp. 702 (D.N.J. 1973),
aff'd, 34 AD. L.2o 534 (3d Cir. 1974) (material allegedly exempt by another statute); M.A.
Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972) (five exemptions construed).
The only authority Bristol-Meyers cited for its influential remark was section 552(c) of
the Act, which states in part: "This section [of the Act] does not authorize withholding of
information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated
in this section." The House Report does not clarify the meaning of "specifically," since
it merely re-uses that word in its discussion of subsection (c). H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1497]. However, the Senate
Report uses the word "explicitly" as a synonym. S. RPa. No. 813, supra note 2, at 10. Thus
it appears likely that Congress intended the words "except as specifically stated" to prevent
courts from inventing new exemptions of their own, rather than to restrict the breadth
of exemptions 1 through 9. This is the interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court
in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973) (exemptions are made "exclusive" by subsection
(c)). Accord, Wellman Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1974), petition for
cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. May 28, 1974).
53 "Requiring the agencies to keep a current index of their orders, opinions, etc.,
- .. will prevent a citizen from losing a controversy with an agency because of some
obscure and hidden order or opinion which the agency knows about but which has been
unavailable to the citizen simply because he had no way in which to discover it." S. REP.
No. 813, supra note 2, at 7. See also Davis, supra note 9, at 772-75, 797, 804. The Act's
greatest practical effect has perhaps been in this area. See id. at 804; Koch, supra note 24,
at 198-200.
,54 H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 52, at 12; see Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft
Clothing Co., 94 S. Ct. 1028, 1037 & n.17, 1039 (1974); Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 816--
17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); ATroRNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE
PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT iii (1967) [herein.
after cited as ATr'Y GEN. MEMO.]; cf. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (1971).
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on executive hegemony, 5 and exposing agency operations to an extent
sufficient to protect the "right of the individual to be able to find out
how his Government is operating."5' 6 Those who received information
required to be disclosed by the Act could counter the executive's
power to manipulate the electorate through secrecy; they could marshal
public opinion to oppose agency action or, if necessary, present the facts
to other branches of the government and appeal for relief. 7
This broad political goal of the FOIA inheres in its structure. The
most striking feature of the Act, perhaps, is that it confers equal rights
upon "any person,"5' 8 irrespective of his purposes in seeking informa-
tion. The Senate report states that the Act "eliminates the test of who
shall have the right to different information. For the great majority of
different records, the public as a whole has a right to know what its
Government is doing."5 9
Courts should be especially sensitive to demands for disclosure of
matters that concern the agency's actions, plans, and policies as they
relate to individuals or the agency's responsibility to the public as a
whole. In camera inspection is particularly appropriate where an
agency may be withholding disclosable information in order to protect
its own authority or reputation.6
Conversely, certain exemptions protect information the revelation
of which would not offer insights into the workings and policies of the
agency. For example, applicants sometimes request information about
particular third parties. Denials of such requests are inherently less
likely to be tainted by motives of concealing the agency's own errors,
55 The Administrative Procedure Act expressly excludes Congress and the judiciary
from the disclosure requirements of the FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 551(l)(A)-(B) (1970).
56 H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 52, at 6; see S. RrP. No. 813, supra note 2, at 3.
Remarks of individual Congressmen during deliberations on the FOIA confirm that
the Act's primary purpose was to expose the workings of the executive branch. Examples
are collected in Dobkin, The Release of Government-Owned Technical Data Under the
Freedom of Information Law: Between Scylla and Charybdis, 14 VILL. L. Ray. 74, 76-78
(1968).
57 Cf. H.R. RF'. No. 1497, supra note 52, at 2.
58 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
59 S. REP. No. 813, supra note 2, at 5; see H. REP. No. 1497, supra note 52, at 1. Virtu-
ally every FOIA case has explicitly recognized this principle. But see Getman v. NLRB,
450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971). The legislative history relied on
in Getman does not support its position. It speaks of "the public's" needs. Yet the
reports consistently use the words "the public" to refer to the public at large, in contra-
distinction to "a person." See, e.g., S. REP. No. 813, supra note 2, at 1-2, amendment 7.
60 The Senate report observes that under the public information statute that pre-
ceded the FOIA, "[i]nnumerable times it appears that information is withheld only to
cover up embarrassing mistakes or irregularities . S. REP. No. 813, supra note 2,
at 3.
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and disclosure of the information is unlikely to provide data germane
to the policies of the Act. In the absence of an allegation of misdescrip-
tion, the courts should therefore give agency claims of exemption in
these cases more credence and demand a less unmistakable showing-an
affidavit instead of an inspection-before sustaining the agency's claim.
III. SPECIFIC EXEMPTIONS
A. The Clear Provisions: Exemptions 9, 8, 1, and 3
Four of the exemptions appear to embody criteria such that factual
issues appropriate for in camera resolution simply do not arise.,' The
paradigmatic examples are exemption 9, which protects "geological
and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning
wells,"6 2 and exemption 8, for "matters ... contained in or related to
examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf
of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or super-
vision of financial institutions."63 There are no reported cases on ex-
emption 9 and only one on exemption 8. That case turned on the issue
of whether the New York Stock Exchange is a "financial institution"
within the meaning of the Act; no fact-finding was necessary to resolve
the exemption 8 claim. 4
The Supreme Court's construction of exemption 1 in EPA v. Mink3
appears to remove any need for in camera inspection under that exemp-
tion, which protects "matters that are . . . specifically required by
Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense
or foreign policy." 66 The Court found that Congress had intended to
eliminate uncertainty in this area by enacting a national security ex-
emption that would turn only on whether an item had been designated
as secret by a person having authority to classify documents under the
provisions of Executive Order 10501.67 This fact may be proven by
affidavit or testimony. Mink rejects the suggestion made in earlier
61 Assuming, of course, that there has been no allegation of misdescription,
62 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(9) (1970).
63 Id. § 552(b)(8).
64 M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972). Finding that the mate-
rials before it were not among those "reports" protected by exemption 8, the Schapiro
court went on to indicate that the identities of persons named in the documents could be
deleted to safeguard their privacy. It is not dear from the opinion whether the court
found the authority for such deletions in exemption 8 or in the business secrets exemp-
tion, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970). The latter explanation seems more plausible, since the
court believed that no "financial institutions" were involved in the case.
65 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
66 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970).
67 410 U.S. at 82, 84. After suit was filed in Mink, this order was superseded by Exec.
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cases"8 that a judge faced with a claim under the national security
exemption may review the classification at least to the extent necessary
to determine that it is not arbitrary or capricious.69
In the same case, Mr. Justice Stewart remarked in his concurring
opinion: "Similarly rigid is [exemption 3], which forbids disclosure of
materials that are 'specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.'
Here... the only 'matter' to be determined in a district court's de novo
inquiry is the factual existence of such a statute ...."-70 The narrow
inquiry presented in an exemption 3 case thus would not ordinarily
require an inspection of the contested records.
The simplest exemption 3 case is one in which a statute categorically
identifies documents to be withheld.71 Examples of such laws are those
that protect individual census reports, 72 reports filed by tobacco
dealers,73 and commitment records of drug addicts admitted to hospitals
Order No. 11652, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974). The Court ruled that the two orders must be
treated identically for FOIA purposes. 410 U.S. at 84 n.9.
68 See, e.g., Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965
(1970).
69 When the government has invoked the privilege for national security materials in
cases other than FOIA proceedings, the courts have reviewed the claim more closely. See,
e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1953) (in Federal Tort Claims Act dis-
covery, court should not uphold claim until satisfied that disclosure would endanger
military secrets). By resting on statutory construction, Mink apparently leaves these
authorities unimpaired.
Opportunities for obtaining public disclosure of classified documents through ad-
ministrative channels appear limited. Under the Executive Order now in force, a mem-
ber of the public has a right to require an administrative review of whether a document
should remain classified, but only for materials that are at least ten years old. Exec.
Order No. 11652, § 5(C)(i), 3 C.F.R. 339, 345 (1974). The Order does not provide for
judicial review of this determination. Early experience with the mandatory declassifica-
tion procedures has revealed a striking lack of cooperation from the executive branch.
See Note, Reform in the Classification and Declassification of National Security Informa-
tion: Nixon Executive Order 11,652, 59 IowA L. Pmv. 110, 125 (1973).
Each House of Congress has recently passed a bill that would explicitly permit the
courts to use in camera inspection to review defenses under the national security exemp-
tion. See note 13 supra. If the Act is amended the executive may nonetheless oppose
furnishing classified documents for the court to inspect, on the grounds that it would
inevitably create dangerous security risks. The Second Circuit rejected a similar claim
by the executive in Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958), an action brought
under the Invention Secrecy Act, which, in the court's view, authorized the in camera
proceeding.
70 410 U.S. at 95 n.* (Stewart, concurring). See also Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930,
933 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
71 See generally STAFF OF SPECIAL SUBCOxM. ON Gov'T INFORMATION, HOUSE COMM. ON
Gov'T OPERATIONS, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., FEDERAL STATUTES ON THE AvAILABILrry OF
INFORMATION 244-75 (1960) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL STATUTES].
72 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1970).
73 7 U.S.C. § 507 (1970).
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as voluntary patients.7' The only issue in such a case is statutory con-
struction. In Legal Aid Society v. Shultz7 5 the government sought to
withhold minority hiring program compliance reports by relying on a
statute that forbade disclosure of all information "obtained by the
[Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission pursuant to its author-
ity under this section ... "76 The court ordered the records released,
ruling that the statute did not confer any authority on the EEOC to
gather the information plaintiff had requested. The EEOC had ap-
parently acquired the data in some other way and thus could not claim
the protection of this statute.71
A more difficult and presently unsettled issue is whether a document
is "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute" if a law prohibits
release except where the agency head has made the information avail-
able by regulation or by exercising his discretion.7 8 Professor Davis has
suggested that such statutes should be considered "specific" enough to
satisfy the exemption because, by comparison with the general dis-
closure provisions of the FOIA, they are more exact expressions of
Congress's wishes concerning the particular kinds of information they
describe.7 9 Whether or not Davis's view is correct, the task for the court
in this situation is to compare two statutes (the FOIA and another) on
their face to decide which takes precedence over the other. Judicial
inspection of the records is not necessary.8 0
B. Restrained Use of In Camera Review: Exemptions 7, 6, and 4
1. The Investigatory Files Exemption. By the terms of the seventh
exemption, the FOIA's disclosure requirements do not reach matters
that are "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes
except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency."'
74 42 U.S.C. § 260(d) (1970).
75 349 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
76 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(8)(e) (1970).
77 349 F. Supp. at 777. See also Nichols v. United States, 460 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972).
78 Compare Stretch v. Weinberger, 34 AD. L.2D 534 (3d Cir. 1974) (ordering disclosure),
with Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 918 (1972); People v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (denying dis-
closure). See generally FEDmAL STATuTES, supra note 71, at 203-26.
79 Davis, supra note 9, at 786-87.
80 Perhaps if, pursuant to such a statute, an agency promulgates a regulation that
requires disclosure of information, such information does not fall within exemption 3.
The practical result of this interpretation would be that a requester could gain relief
through FOIA enforcement procedures if agency personnel failed to comply with the
agency regulation.
81 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970). The "except" clause prevents the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500 (1970), from being overruled by implication. Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591 (D.
Del. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 479 F.2d 317 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 448 (1973).
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A few courts have deemed it necessary to order in camera examination
of a file to determine whether the literal language of this exemption is
applicable,8 2 but it is a straightforward description that ordinarily
should not require that step.s3
Litigation of this exemption has been complicated, however, by a
gloss that some courts have added to the words of the provision. In
Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC,84 a leading case, the court directed that on
remand the trial court must determine "whether the prospect of en-
forcement is concrete enough to bring into operation the exemp-
tion .... ,,s In that case, the complaint that would have been the
foundation of the litigation had been withdrawn two years earlier;
the implication of the court's statement is that termination of enforce-
ment efforts removes the file from the exception.80 This seems in accord
with the committee reports' only specific justification for the exemption
-to prevent prejudice to a government court action.8 7
Later decisions, however, have imputed other motives to Congress
and have ruled that even when an investigation has been terminated,
the entire file may be withheld from disclosure in order to protect
investigative techniques, the identity of government informers, and
the privacy of those who are investigated.88 For example, in Aspin v.
Department of Defense 9 a Congressman sued for disclosure of the
Army's four-volume report of inquiry on the famous My Lai incident.
Without reaching the question of whether disclosure could hurt the
government's court case at any time in the future,90 the court held that
the entire report was exempt as an investigatory file.91 The plaintiff
in Weisberg v. Department of Justice92 had requested the FBI's spectro-
graphic analyses of bullets involved in the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy. Without having to allege that any particular agency
82 Stern v. Richardson, 367 F. Supp. 1316 (D.D.C. 1973); Cowles Communications, Inc.
v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
83 See, e.g., Ditlow v. Brinegar, 34 AD. L.2D 520 (D.C. Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed,
42 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. May 28, 1974); Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc); cf. Holiday Magic, Inc. v. FTC, 32 AD. L.2D 793 (D.D.C. 1973).
84 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
85 Id. at 939.
86 See also Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968)
(rejecting exemption 7 claim for file complied four and a half years earlier, with no
apparent prospect of actual use).
87 S. R.P. No. 813, supra note 2, at 9; see H. REP. No. 1497, supra note 52, at 11
(giving no justification).
88 E.g., Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F. 2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Frankel v. SEC,
460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); Cowles Communications, Inc. v.
Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
89 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
90 See id. at 28 n.27.
01 Id. at 28.
92 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en basnc).
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interest was at stake, the Department successfully resisted disclosure by
showing that the analyses were part of the-FBI's investigatory files. This
interpretation of the investigatory files exemption clearly requires no
in camera inspection.
The rule allowing permanent protection for an investigatory file con-
flicts, however, with the public's valid interest in knowing the way in
which agencies are performing their law enforcement functions. If
the agencies are able to close off this phase of their activity from
public scrutiny, it will be considerably more difficult for the electorate
to prevent abuses of prosecutorial discretionY3 Further, the historical
fact that certain materials were gathered during an investigation bears
no necessary relation to the interests that will be served by disclosure
or nondisclosure.94
The broad interpretation given in Aspin and Weisberg is not neces-
sary. Other exemptions protect the government's interests in nondis-
closure-the internal practices exemption protects secret techniques,95
and the identities of informers and persons investigated are protected
by the business secrets and personal privacy exemptions. 96 These exemp-
tions limit the scope of potential disclosure under Bristol-Meyers, but
the residuum is potentially valuable information that should be avail-
able to the public. The Bristol-Meyers approach best balances the aims
of the Act with particular needs for confidentiality.
9 7
93 Cf. K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JusTicE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 226 (1969). The po-
tential value of the narrower reading of the exemption in bringing public information
into the open is illustrated by a recent district court decision giving a television reporter
access to Justice Department information on the counterintelligence program maintained
by the FBI against radical organizations in the late 1960s. Stern v. Richardson, 367 F.
Supp. 1316 (D.D.C. 1973).
94 In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Department of Housing & Urban Development,
343 F. Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the court held that since FHA appraisers' names were
not themselves exempt from disclosure, the fact that they had been inserted into an
investigatory file did not necessarily afford any protection.
95 See text and notes at notes 151-58 infra (exemption 2). A recent order by the
Attorney General, 38 Fed. Reg. 19029 (1973), to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 50.8, provides
for the public release of Justice Department investigatory files that are fifteen years old,
with allowable deletions of, inter alia, investigative techniques and procedures. The order
thus attests to the feasibility of separating out matters of technique and releasing the
other portions of a file.
96 See text and notes at notes 98-105 & 124 infra (exemptions 6 and 4). Exemption
4 operates only in a business context; however, a strong argument could also be made
that forced disclosure of an informer's identity is precluded by exemption 6. The invasion
of privacy could be deemed "clearly unwarranted" in light of the informer's privilege
that is well established at common law. See, e.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53
(1957); Annot., 8 A.L.R. Fed. 6.(1971).
97 The Senate's bill to amend the Act, see note 13 supra, would revise the investiga-
tory files exemption so that it explicitly authorizes a balancing of interests along the line
of Bristol-Meyers. See 120 CONG. REc. S. 9329-37 (daily ed. May 30, 1974).
In Camera Inspections Under the FOIA
Courts following Bristol-Meyers will conduct an inquiry into whether
the contested file is the basis for an ongoing or probable future en-
forcement proceeding. This inquiry would not, however, require an
inspection of the documents. The court's determination of this issue
would presumably be based on circumstantial evidence such as the
testimony of agency personnel. Thus even the more individualized
approach to exemption 7 does not require in camera inspection.
2. The Privacy Exemption. The sixth exemption is for "[M]atters
that are... personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure
of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy."9' 8 The legislative history shows unmistakable concern for the
privacy rights of individuals, which the Senate committee termed
"equally [as] important" as the "broad philosophy of 'freedom of
information' " of the Act.99 The privacy exemption protects against
the release of files on identified persons which agencies such as the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Selective Service
System, and the Bureau of Prisons maintain.10° An example of its
practical application is the Justice Department's routine practice of
denying access to identified files of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service.101 Many such requests have come from creditors of recent
immigrants. Insofar as it consists of refusal to give out information on
identified persons, the Department's policy seems entirely in accord
with Congress's intent.10 2
The exemption has been one of the most frequently invoked, 03
but there are a bare handful of reported cases that deal with it. The
disparity indicates that perhaps the provision should be grouped with
the other exemptions that are unambiguous enough to require minimal
judicial surveillance. 104
A more active judicial role would be necessary if courts took it upon
themselves to examine these files in camera and separate out "non-
secret" portions for disclosure. 0 5 This is not, however, a desirable
98 5 U.s.c. § 552(b)(6) (1970).
99i S. RE'. No. 813, supra note 2, at 3; see H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 52, at 6;
ATr'Y GEN. MEMO., supra note 54, at ii (statement of President Johnson at signing of
FOIA).
100 S. REP. No. 813, supra note 2, at 9; H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 52, at II.
101 1972 Hearings, supra note 19, at 1176; cf. Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (request for immigrant's file denied on
investigatory file exemption grounds; congressional intent to protect privacy inferred from
personal privacy exemption, which is incorrectly cited as subsection (b)(5)).
102 H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 52, at 11.
103 1972 Hearings, supra note 19, at 1342.
104 See text and notes at notes 61-80 supra.
10 This practice is advocated by Professor Davis. See Davis, supra note 9, at 798-99.
It should be noted that courts have taken the "clearly unwarranted" restriction in sub-
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course. It ignores the fact, widely recognized in other contexts, 10 that
disclosure of much seemingly innocuous information about an identi-
fied person will still injure privacy interests if made readily available
to "any person."10 7 More fundamentally, this judicial solicitude would
tend primarily to benefit those who wish to use personal information
for commercial or other private purposes, rather than the public at
large for whose interests Congress passed the FOIA. 0 s. The exemption
should of course not be used to prevent the disclosure of information
with the identification of the parties removed. The process of rendering
a report anonymous, however, will not necessarily require court
participation.
3. The Business Secrets Exemption. The fourth exemption, for
"trade secrets and commercial or financial information received from
a person and privileged or confidential," has been frequently litigated,
largely because its phrasing and its legislative history will support
several different interpretations. 10 9 The most difficult problem has been
to define the phrase "privileged or confidential.""u 0 A number of factors
are relevant to this question, and they-affect the propriety of in camera
review.
In a recent opinion, National Parks & Conservation Association v.
Morton,"' the District of Columbia Circuit attempted to clear the air
by announcing that records would be deemed "confidential" for pur-
section (b)(6) quite seriously. See Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973); Getman v.
NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971); Wine Hobby, USA, Inc.
v. United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 8& Firearms, 363 F. Supp. 231 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Although this wording may confine the number of files that could fall within the
exemption, it does not require dissection of the file. Courts are free to resolve the latter
issue on policy grounds.
106 Cf. Note, Privacy and Efficient Government: Proposals for a National Data Center,
82 HAitV. L. Ray. 400, 410 (1968).
107 But see Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677 n.24 (D.C. Cir.), stay denied, 404 U.S.
1204 (1971).
108 Id. at 681 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
109 See generally Davis, supra note 9, at 787-93. The courts fairly consistently have
ruled that the exemption refers only to commercial and financial information, and that
the protected information must have been received from a person outside the agency.
See Note, The Freedom of Information Act-The Parameters of the Exemptions, 62
GEo. L.J. 177, 186-88 (1973) (collecting authorities) [hereinafter cited as Parameters].
110 Perhaps the best illustration of the judiciary's uncertainty on this point is Ditlow v.
Volpe, 362 F. Supp. 1321 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Ditlow v. Brine-
gar, 34 A. L.2D 520 (D.C. Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. May
28, 1974), where the court stated that the test of confidentiality was whether the supplier
of the information would customarily disclose it to the public, but then indicated that
there would be nothing improper about agency disclosure that prejudiced the supplier's
interests. 362 F. Supp. at 1324 nA.
1 34 AD. L.2D 780 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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poses of the exemption if their disclosure would be likely "(1) to im-
pair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the
future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of
the person from whom the information was obtained."'" 2 The first
alternative in the Morton test points up agencies' legitimate need to
preserve the willingness of businesses to turn over information volun-
tarily.113 The second half recognizes that businessmen may have strong
proprietary interests in data about their companies." 4 This criterion,
however, might justifiably have been omitted from the definition of
"confidential." Business data fitting this description can properly be
brought under the "trade secrets" wording.115 Further, such informa-
tion is prima facie exempt from production in civil discovery," 6 and
thus may fall into the "privileged" category of the statutory exemption.
The Morton tests will allow at least some claims under the business
secrets exemption to be resolved without in camera inspection. If the
agency is relying on the "information-gathering" rationale, it will argue
on the basis of the circumstances under which it received the informa-
tion; knowledge of the specific contents of the records will not help in
the determination whether disclosure would retard collection of other
data." 7 For example, according to FCC regulations, citizens may send
112 Id. at 786.
113 See Sperry & Hutchinson Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,505
(FTC), afL'd, 256 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential
Information by the Federal Trade Commission: Pretrial Practices, 36 U. CHI. L. R-v.
113, 149, 163 n.219 (1968).
Professor Gellhorn suggests that the FTC's concern about the drying up of information
sources due to threatened disclosure is excessive, because the real impetus for supplying
what the agency wants is the fear of compulsory process. Id. at 163 & n.220. His discussion,
however, refers primarily to discovery activity in connection with the development of
complaints, where use of subpoena powers would be expected. The argument is less
persuasive in situations in which the government routinely collects information but does
not have authority to require reporting, see, e.g., 1972 Hearings, supra note 19, at 1619
(Bureau of Labor Statistics economic surveys), or where reliance on compulsory means of
collection would be inconvenient, Cf. J. WOGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2377 (3d ed. 1940).
A company that does not trust an agency to keep confidential records secret may
acquiesce in an agency's erroneous interpretation of substantive law, rather than contest
the ruling and risk the dissemination of its information. "Thus, defending a complaint,
even with a valid defense, may be more damaging than signing a consent decree." Graber
Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (D.D.C. 1963).
114 See Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 355 F. Supp. 1171, 1175 (D.D.C. 1973).
115 R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRTS § 2.09[8] (1974); Gellhorn, Business Secrets in Administra-
tive Agency Adjudication, 22 AD. L. REv. 515, 515-16 (1970). See also Kewanee Oil Co.
v. Bicron Corp., 94 S. Ct. 1879, 1883 (1974).
116 Gellhorn, supra note 19, at 409. In ordinary court litigation the privilege can be
overcome if the adverse party shows that the requested material is relevant to his case.
R. MILGRIM, supra note 115, at § 7.06[1][b]. The FOIA plaintiff, however, has no such
needs to show. See text and notes at notes 58-59 supra.
117 Similarly, plaintiffs could introduce circumstantial evidence that refuted the assertion
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inquiries to the Commission with a stipulation that if the agency
cannot promise to keep the information in the request confidential, it
should return the materials without consideration. 118 Obviously the
FCC needs to promise confidentiality in order to acquire such informa-
tion. Under Morton, a suit for public disclosure of these records would
presumably turn on whether such data collection is "necessary," not
on the contents of any individual file.
In some instances, the court may be satisfied of a potential harm to
the supplier's competitive position without using in camera inspection.
The agency might show, for example, that it received the requested
records at a hearing that had been kept private at the supplier's in-
sistence. Agencies are generally reluctant to permit public hearings
and will do so only with a showing of good cause." 9 The fact that a
private hearing was granted would not bind the court in the FOIA
action because review under the Act is de novo; yet the court could
reasonably rely on the fact as highly probative of the supplier's interest
in continued secrecy. Another mode of review not requiring direct
inspection is participation in the action by the supplier himself, inter-
vening under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or mak-
ing his views known more informally.
20
In some cases in which the issue is possible competitive harm, in
camera inspection will be appropriate. Where the evidence is unclear,
the most efficient way to resolve the issue may be for the judge to
examine the allegedly confidential data and use his own judgment.
In some ways this procedure is preferable to soliciting the supplier's
of a confidential understanding. For example, they might show that the agency had previ-
ously released the information to others, without objection from suppliers having notice.
See Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1973) (exemption 6 case).
118 1972 Hearings, supra note 19, at 1799-1801.
119 Gellhorn, supra note 115, at 525. See generally Cohn & Zuckerman, FCC v. Schreiber:
In Camera and the Administrative Agency, 56 Gao. L.J. 451 (1968).
120 See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (disclosure refused
where suppliers sought to prevent release); Fisher v. Renegotiation Board, 355 F. Supp.
1171, 1175 (D.D.C. 1973) (same); Consolidated Box Co. v. United States, 24 AD. L.2D (Ct.
Cl. 1974) (disclosure permitted where supplier had opportunity to intervene but did not
do so); cf. M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972) (after an in camera
inspection, the court authorized the deletion of names of persons who testified in FOIA
action).
A supplier who believes that the agency is not adequately defending his rights may also
engage in a collateral proceeding to enjoin the government from complying with an FOIA
request. See Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. -Department of Housing & Urban Develop-
ment, 360 F. Supp. 212 (D.D.C. 1973) (relief granted). But see Gellhorn, supra note 19, at
434 & n.178 (injunction available only in exceptional circumstances). This remedy will be
effective only if the supplier has notice of the FOIA request.
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opinions on whether disclosure will injure his interests. First, contact-
ing the supplier is frequently a time-consuming process,121 in contra-
vention of the FOIA's emphasis on promptness.122 Second, there may
be too many suppliers to contact feasibly, for example, if the requested
information consists of the results of a questionnaire. 1'
In camera inspection will also be appropriate if descriptions of the
records indicate that they are heterogeneous, and inspection is likely
to permit the court to separate disclosable portions from the whole or
delete identifying details.124 If internal agency records incorporate in-
formation subject to the business secrets exemption, they may be
withheld only if any partial release would injure suppliers. 125 The
fact that such records may reveal agency operations, rather than merely
facts about private parties, suggests that close, in camera inspection is
warranted.
C. Activist Review: Exemptions 5 and 2
1. The Memoranda Exemption. The fifth exemption is for "inter-
agency and intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency."'126 It is designed to foster unrestrained airing of policy alterna-
tives within the agency decision making process. Congress accepted the
agencies' contention that "it would be impossible to have any frank
discussion of legal or policy matters in writing if all such writings were
to be subjected to public scrutiny.' 1 27 If advisory memoranda were not
exempt, the "threat of cross-examination in a public tribunal" might
deter policy-makers from offering tentative suggestions, perhaps of a
creative or heretical character. 128 The courts recognize, however, two
exceptions to the general exemption of memoranda: factual material
that is separable from the advisory material, and opinions that have
121 See 1972 Hearings, supra note 19, at 1556, 1797.
122 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
123 See S. RFP. No. 813, supra note 2, at 9.
124 See National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 34 AD. L.2D 780, 787 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1307 (D.D.C. 1973). See also
Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
125 Cf. Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 355 F. Supp. 1171, 1175 (D.D.C. 1973).
126 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
127 S. REI,. No. 813, supra note 2, at 9.
128 Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1969). It has also been suggested that
the exemption reinforces the principle that responsibility for a decision reached must lie
with the official who makes the final judgment, and not with subordinates. Soucie v. David,
448 F.2d 1067, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wilkey, J., concurring).
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been adopted as legal policy-or legal interpretations. In camera inspec-
tion is extremely desirable in isolating factual material, but of little
utility in discovering when.a recommendation is in fact "secret law."
a. Factual Materials. The requirement in exemption 5 that the
material must not be "available by law to a [private party] in litigation"
has consistently been held to deny exemption to portions of advisory
memoranda that do not expose the decision making process. 129 This
reading reflects Congress's attempt to "delimit the exception as nar-
rowly as consistent with efficient Government operation."'130
Disclosure of facts that bear on important decisions is at the heart of
the FOIA's concern, for it is essential to public debate on the correct-
ness of the decision. In camera inspection is a method of insuring that
the maximum amount of disclosable material reaches the public.
In Soucie v. David,131 citizens filed suit under the Act to acquire a
report prepared by the Office of Science and Technology, assessing the
government's program to develop the SST aircraft. The government
claimed exemption because the report contained "opinions, conclu-
sions, and recommendations prepared for the advice of the President."
The District of Columbia Circuit agreed that recommendations are
protected by exemption 5, but remanded the case for a determination
whether any nonadvisory, factual portions of the report could be sepa-
rated out and released. The court said: "It would defeat the purposes
of the Act ... to withhold from the public factual information on a
federal scientific program whose future is at the center of public
debate."' 32
129 See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969). The qualifying clause is held to
refer to the evidentiary rule that government advice memoranda can be withheld. The
rule, and thus the exemption, does not reach separable factual matters. See, e.g., Machin v.
Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963).
This limitation on "executive privilege" should be distinguished from the decision in
the Watergate tapes case, Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973). That case held
that, despite a Presidential claim of privilege, records of deliberations and advice within
the executive branch were discoverable if the opposing litigant's need to use them as evi-
dence was sufficiently compelling, in the opinion of the court, to outweigh the breach of
confidentiality that disclosure would entail. The FOIA exemption should be read, how-
ever, to exclude only those items that would be available on a minimal showing of need
in litigation. The balancing of need aspects of Nixon v. Sirica would therefore not be
read into exemption 5. See text and notes at notes 58-59 supra.
130 S. REP. No. 813, supra note 2, at 9.
131 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
132 Id. at 1090. The rationale for intensive review is no less strong if the subject matter
of the requested memoranda does not happen to be the object of contemporary public
debate; the FOIA was intended also to bring to light issues that otherwise might be
covered up and ignored.
[41:557
1974] In Camera Inspections Under the FOIA
Court scrutiny of documents for which this exemption is claimed
is particularly appropriate because of the risk that the agencies will
apply this exemption broadly,133 since their own vested interests are
likely to be at stake. Disclosure of factual information relevant to policy
decisions may expose an agency's inefficiency or administrative errors;
it may also give ammunition to those who oppose programs and
policies the agency supports, or vice versa.'
34
The Supreme Court suggested in Environmental Protection Agency
v. Mink'3 5 that courts should be slow to order an in camera inspection
to resolve an exemption 5 controversy, because "[i]t seems . . .obvious
that the very purpose of the privilege, the encouragement of open
expression of opinion as to governmental policy is somewhat impaired
by a requirement to submit the evidence even [in camera]."' 36 This
concern seems excessive. There is no reason for a decisionmaker to be
"chilled" by the possibility that a single judge will view his memo-
133 Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969). A lawyer who frequently represents
plaintiffs in FOIA actions has claimed that agency employees do in fact frequently with-
hold factual portions of policy memoranda, in violation of the Act. 1972 Hearings, supra
note 19, at 1400.
134 Note, The Freedom of Information Act and the Exemption for Intra-Agency Memo-
randa, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1054 n.32 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Intra-Agency].
135 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
136 Id. at 93, quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp.
939, 947 (Ct. Cl. 1958). Kaiser Aluminum was decided under the pre-Act doctrine of execu-
tive privilege. See note 129 supra. Congress intended to incorporate the privilege into the
memoranda exemption, Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1969), and the Fourth
Circuit has held that the government enjoys no greater protection under the executive
privilege doctrine than it possesses under exemption 5 as construed in Mink. Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1973).
It has been suggested that a formal claim of executive privilege in an FOIA case re-
quires the court to pay more than ordinary deference to an agency's description of its
records. Proponents of this argument maintain that the privilege rests in part on the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, and thus cannot be eliminated by Con-
gressional action. See Soude v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wilkey, J.,
concurring). But cf. Davis, supra note 9, at 793. This position appears to misconceive the
nature of the separation of powers principle. In Justice Brandeis's famous formulation,
the purpose of the doctrine is "not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of
arbitrary power." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (dissent). This standard
implies that the constitutional validity of the Act's directive to disclose turns on whether
the Act unduly strengthens Congress, not on whether it unduly weakens the executive.
Thus Professor Bishop makes his case for executive privilege by pointing to the danger of
a Senator Joseph McCarthy badgering helpless agency personnel. Bishop, The Executive's
Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YaE L.J. 477, 488 (1957).
The FOIA is an exercise of Congressional power, of course, but Congress is not the
beneficiary in a direct sense. The principal effect of the Act is to enable the public to un-
cover and thereby to remedy abuses of executive power. Restrictive application of the
memoranda exemption, without additional deference to claims of privilege, does not
frustrate, but rather serves, the policies that underlie the separation of powers doctrine.
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randum. What the official could rationally fear is an increased chance
that his opinions will be erroneously disclosed to the public. The
fact-opinion criterion is not difficult for a court to apply, however,
and it is inherently weighted in favor of the agency, because factual
material "inextricably intertwined with policymaking processes" is
not subject to disclosure. 137 Thus there is little chance that an in camera
search for disclosable chapters or pages in a report will lead to inad-
vertent release of advisory material, which the memoranda exemption
was meant to protect.21
The narrow holding of Mink is reasonable: in camera inspection of
an intra-agency memorandum should be avoided if the agency can
satisfy its burden of proof in other ways. The considerable public
interest involved and the distinctive potential for abuse of this exemp-
tion suggest, however, that a judge should be particularly cautious
before deciding that he is satisfied- with the alternative showing.
b. Secret Law. A second judicial limitation on the scope of exemp-
tion 5 is the rule that a memorandum adopted by an agency as the
basis for its decision in an adjudication must be disclosed, even though
recommendatory and therefore exempt under traditional discovery
principles. 139 As the court explained in Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC:14
"These are not the ideas and theories which go into the making of the
law, they are the law itself, and as such should be made available to
the public. Thus, to prevent the development of secret law within the
Commission, we must require it to disclose orders and opinions which
it actually applies in cases before it." The court remanded the case so
that the district judge could examine the contested memoranda and
determine whether any of them fit this description.
Although the public interest in curtailing "secret law" is extremely
high,141 the utility of in camera inspection to further this goal is limited.
137 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 92 (1973); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1088 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
138 In addition, it can be argued that threatened disclosure of an official's factual con-
clusions is significantly less "chilling" than the threat that his recommendations and value
judgments will be made public, because in the latter situation the potential for embar-
rassment and personal attack is greater. Note, Intra-Agency, supra note 134, at 1053.
139 The technical justification for this rule is that an agency has an affirmative statutory
duty to make such opinions available for public inspection and copying, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)
(2)(A)-(B) (1970), and thus they are not "intra-agency." See American Mail Line, Ltd. v.
Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
140 450 F.2d 698, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d
696, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 371 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D.D.C.
1973).
141 See text and note at note 53 supra.
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A court can, of course, examine the decisional documents that were
prepared in connection with a given case, hoping that one will identify
itself as the one stating the controlling principles of the decision. Yet
without prior evidence that such a document exists,
14 2 the inquiry is
essentially a shot in the dark. In many instances commissioners or high
department officials may rely entirely on oral consultation with their
subordinates and never express their theories in writing. In other cases,
they may consider several recommendations and never fully agree
among themselves which governs the decision taken.
A general policy against using in camera proceedings to find memo-
randa adopted by an agency should, of course, yield to a suitable show-
ing by the plaintiff that such a document probably exists. Proof that
the agency customarily explains its decisions in written form would
furnish an adequate predicate, or the plaintiff might establish the
existence of secret law by referring to evidence contained in a separate
document, such as agency staff instructions that refer to a memorandum
as if the latter expressed the agency's view on a matter of substantive
law.143
2. The Internal Practices Exemption. In camera inspection to pre-
vent the growth of secret law is also appropriate in the context of
exemption 2, for "matters ... related solely to the internal personnel
rules and practices of an agency."'
4 The courts are in conflict 4 5 over
whether the exemption refers only to rules that touch on an agency's
physical management of its work force,
46 as the Senate report main-
tains,147 or extends to virtually all staff instructions, as the House report
implies.148 Neither of these two readings of the statute is attractive
142 In American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the Maritime
Board rendered a decision against plaintiff in an adjudication, stating that its decision was
based on a certain undisclosed memorandum but not openly explaining 
its reasoning in
any detail. The court ordered the release of the memorandum. Such "incorporation 
by
reference," while dearly sufficient to bring section 552(a)(2)(A) into play, is unlikely to
occur very often.
143 Cf. Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 371 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1973).
144 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1970).
145 See Note, Parameters, supra note 109, at 182-85 (collecting cases).
146 Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590, 594 (W.D. Wash. 1968), afl'd, 415 F.2d 878 (9th
Cir. 1969).
147 The Senate Report indicates that subsection (b)(2) protects only matters such as
"rules as to personnel's use of parking facilities or regulation of lunch hours, statements
of policy as to sick leave, and the like." S. REP. No. 813, supra note 2, at 8.
143 The House report states that, with a few minor exceptions, "[o]perating rules,
guidelines, and manuals of procedure for Government investigators and examiners" 
are
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as a matter of policy. The broad construction of the exemption permits
the withholding of much secret law,149 but the narrower version may
compel the disclosure of the agency's investigative strategy and ulti-
mately undermine the effectiveness of its law enforcement.50
The language of the statute suggests a third, more acceptable in-
terpretation-that secret law is disclosable but enforcement strategies
are not.' 5 ' "[I]nformation which either defines or provides a way of
determining the extent of substantive rights and liabilities"'1 2 cannot
be related "solely" to internal practices of an agency, as exemption 2
would require for protection from disclosure. Agency records of the
tactics it employs to monitor compliance with the law, however, do not
in themselves prescribe standards for citizen conduct; such records
prescribe conduct for government personnel. Enforcement strategy
does "relat[e] solely to the internal ... practices of an agency," because
only agency employees have the job of enforcing the law.
This interpretation is supported by the requirements of subsection
(a)(2)(C), which provides that agencies must make available for public
inspection and copying "administrative staff manuals and instructions
to staff that affect a member of the public." The word "administrative"
was added late in the drafting of the FOIA, to make the requirement
apply to "administrative matters" but not "law enforcement matters."
The Senate committee said that this limitation "protects the traditional
confidential nature of instructions to Government personnel prosecut-
ing violations of law in court, while permitting a public examination
of the basis for administrative action."' 53 In Hawkes v. IRS,54 the Sixth
Circuit endorsed this distinction and termed it the "only legitimate
basis" for drawing the line of disclosure for staff instructions.,, Exemp-
tion 2 should be construed to reinforce that line. 56
149 See text and note at note 53 supra.
150 "[Plaintiffs seek materials] relating to the general organization, planning and con-
duct of a 'stakeout.' It takes no peculiar ability in crime detection nor any imagination to
conclude that the nature of the instruction that the government gives its law enforcement
agents could be of interest to those against whom such techniques are used, and that dis-
closure of that information would tend to materially lessen the effectiveness of the tech-
niques described and taught." City of Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958, 959 (N.D.
Cal. 1971).
151 Cf. Davis, supra note 9, at 783.
152 Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086, 1091 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
153 S. REP. No. 813, supra note 2, at 2.
'54 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
155 Id. at 794.
156 In Hawkes the court erroneously assumed that adherence to the Senate's narrow ex-
planation of exemption 2, see note 147 supra, would support subsection (a)(2)(C)'s policy
of disclosing administrative, but not law enforcement, instructions. 467 F.2d at 796-97.
It failed to realize that law enforcement manuals, even if not available under subsec-
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This interpretation of exemption 2 was in effect adopted without
explanation in Cuneo v. Schlesinger.157 The District of Columbia
Circuit ruled that the Department of Defense could refuse to disclose
its manual for the auditing of defense contract compliance insofar as
it consisted of tactics to be employed in conducting an audit, but that
the applicant had a right to know "secret law," such as the accounting
principles the government expects contractors to follow. The court
remanded, directing the district court to conduct a Vaughn-type in
camera inspection and to rule separately on discrete units of the
manual.1 5
The detailed examination ordered in Cuneo should be adopted in
other exemption 2 cases. The public interest in seeing parts, though
not the entirety, of agency staff instructions is strong and is closely
related to the goals of the Act. In contrast to the need for circumstan-
tial evidence in the search for secret law under the fifth exemption, a
court should be able to discern the import of different sections of a
manual from looking at the document itself, at least if a clarifying
pleading accompanies it. The relevant test is not difficult to apply, and
in camera inspection can provide a better adjudication of the FOIA
claim than would be available without it.
CONCLUSION
In camera inspections enable courts to reach informed results in
certain Freedom of Information Act suits. In camera inspections,
however, can also cause procedural handicaps to plaintiffs and incon-
venience to the agencies and courts. In camera inspections are most
valuable when the adverse parties in the suit disagree on the factual
nature of the requested records; the application of the claimed exemp-
tion depends on the specific contents of the records; or the withholding
may conceal information about agency operations. By concentrating
their most intensive review techniques on cases that are most likely to
present those circumstances-particularly suits involving the memo-
randa and internal practices exemptions--courts can enforce the FOIA
efficiently without sacrificing the ideals of open government that the
Act was intended to foster.
Ronald M. Levin
tion (a)(2)(C), are nevertheless available to "any person" under subsection (a)(3) unless
protected by one of the nine exemptions. Thus, only the construction suggested in the
text supports the outcome favored in Hawkes.
157 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
158 Id. at 1090-91.
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